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Abstract: Open access reforms in railways allow multiple train operators to provide rail 
services on a common infrastructure.  As railway operations are now independently 
managed by different stakeholders, conflicts in operations may arise, and there have 
been attempts on deriving an effective access charge regime so that these conflicts may 
be resolved.  One approach is by direct negotiation between the infrastructure manager 
and the train service providers.  Despite the substantial literatures available on the 
issue, few of which have considered the benefits of employing computer simulation as 
an evaluation tool of railway operational activities such as access pricing.  This paper 
proposes a Multi-agent System (MAS) framework for the railway open market and 
demonstrates its feasibility by modelling the negotiation between an infrastructure 
provider and a train service operator.  Empirical results have shown that the model is 
capable of resolving operational conflicts according to the market demand. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, railway regulatory reforms have been implemented in many countries 
where the primary objective is to introduce intra-modal competition within their railway 
markets.  The successful reform precedents in gas, electricity and telecommunication 
utilities have encouraged the adoption of an open access approach.  It involves 
distributing the management of infrastructure facilities and train operations to 
independent stakeholders so that multiple train-service providers can gain access to a 
common infrastructure by paying an access fee.  A contestable railway market can 
therefore be achieved through the competition of track capacity and customers between 
the train operators. 
Owing to the limited availability of track resources, the infrastructure provider has 
to decide which and when a service provider has the right to operate its train services.  
However, it is inevitable that these independently managed stakeholders will experience 
disputes over prices and service characteristics (e.g. train types and speeds) due to their 
differences in operational objectives.  To resolve conflicts between the stakeholders, 
posted pricing, negotiation and auctioning have been proposed to associate the access 
charge either to the incurred usage cost or to the market expectation.  Unfortunately, 
since most reforms are at their infancy of development, the railway industry is still 
striving for better means of access pricing and capacity allocation.   
Most studies have aimed to analyse the existing market according to the observed 
outcomes from these reforms, but there has been little research devoted to evaluate the 
performance of the pricing mechanisms by the use of simulation and modelling.  In 
fact, there has been even a lack of study to examine the requirements and feasibility of 
adopting a simulation approach. 
Although this paper is not intended to compare the merits and limitations of 
different charging regimes, it aims to provide the necessary backgrounds to fill the gap 
of the need to devise a plausible evaluation tool for the railway open market.  This 
study identifies the key modelling issues in the reformed railways and investigates the 
feasibility of modelling the railway open market by a multi-agent system (MAS) 
approach.  MAS-modelling is an increasingly popular method to solve distributed 
problems involving entities with high degrees of autonomy, rationality and social 
capability.  This field of study contains models for both decision-making and 
negotiation activities between trading parties.  As a result, it provides a potentially 
viable approach in modelling the transaction in the open railway market. 
This paper is organised as follow.  Section 2 reviews the access charging and 
traffic management problems emerged from the railway open market.  Section 3 then 
identifies the difficulties in modelling the competitive market and proposes a MAS 
framework for developing the simulation tool.  Section 4 continues with modelling of 
a negotiation between an infrastructure provider and a train service operator.  A 
simulation study is performed in section 5 to illustrate the capability of the model to 
resolve conflicts dynamically by responding to the market demand.   
 
2. RAILWAY OPEN MARKETS 
2.1. Railway Competitions 
Railway businesses are often referred as natural monopolies and have limited 
competition because of the lumpiness in infrastructure provision.  When a rail network 
is constructed or expanded, track capacity is often created in large incremental step 
(lump) relatively to the unit consumption by the train services.  In other words, the 
newly built infrastructure can support a large increase in traffic volume.  Since the 
fixed investment cost is recovered from the actual rise in demand, the average cost of 
transportation declines when traffic volume increases over the range of additional 
capacity.  Consequently, it is usually cheaper to provide train services when the entire 
demand is captured by a single operator (Fig. 1).   
In the recent decades, there has been a change in perspective that competition is 
possible for train operations (above-rail activities) even though infrastructure provisions 
(below-rail activities) may elude.  The barrier to competition may therefore be lowered 
by allowing multiple train service operators to gain access to the infrastructure from a 
common provider.  Countries such as Argentina and Japan have adopted a third-party 
access approach in which external train operators have mandated right of entry to a 
vertically-integrated railway [1, 2].  In other words, apart from the trains operated by 
the infrastructure owner, other parties may also run trains on the same track.  
Alternatively, other places like Sweden and UK have sought for open access reform, 
where train operations are completely separated from infrastructure provision [1, 2].  
These new market structures allow competition between train operators, and some of 
which have also introduced additional competition in ancillary services such as 
rolling-stock leasing and maintenance service provision. 
Introducing above-rail competition is considered to be an effective means to reduce 
expenditure and increase revenue [3].  A competitive market can provide more choices 
to the consumers which creates pressure for the stakeholders in their spending.  The 
stakeholders are also pressed for developing innovative plans and services so as to 
exploit new markets and maintain profits.  Despite these ideal benefits of competition, 
the access reform in railways has generated new challenges in deriving the access 
charge and resolving conflicts in traffic management. 
Insert Figure 1 about here. 
2.2. Access Pricing Policies 
Posted pricing, direct negotiation and auctioning are the three proposed mechanisms to 
access charge setting.  In posted pricing, charge rates are established in advance and 
published to the access seekers.  The tariff is often composed of a basic charge in terms 
of the vehicle-kilometre or gross tonne-kilometre transported, and an uplift cost that is 
levied according to the operating characteristics (e.g. freight/passenger services and type 
of rolling-stocks).  In direct negotiation, the infrastructure provider and the train 
operator take turns to make concessions on issues including access charge, train 
schedule and operating characteristics until both stakeholders agree on the terms of 
usage.  For auctioning, capacity is pre-packaged into various sets of non-conflicting 
train paths to allow interested seekers to bid at their most preferred prices.  The 
operator with the highest bid will obtain the train paths under a set of restrictions. 
Apparently, posted pricing provides train operators with more certainty in 
managing their businesses, but the infrastructure provider may fail to discriminate train 
operators with different operating requirements effectively.  For example, trains 
travelling at different speeds may be charged identically even though they have different 
traction energy and peak demand requirements.  Conversely, services with identical 
speed specifications but scheduled on different traffic environments might also be 
charged at the same price despite having different capacity consumption (see below).  
On the other hand, direct negotiation and auctioning have better capability to distinguish 
operators with respect to their willingness-to-pay for the right-of-ways.  Nevertheless, 
experiences have suggested that negotiated pricing can sometime required timely and 
costly transactions, while auctioning has never been employed in practice because of the 
difficulty in devising train paths that simultaneously suite the requirements of several 
train operators [2].  These existing regimes have their merits and limitations, and the 
railway regulators and stakeholders are still striving for better alternatives whenever 
possible.   
 
2.3. Conflict Resolution in Resource Allocation 
Along with determining a suitable pricing regime, the infrastructure provider also needs 
to formulate a conflict-free and preferably efficient resource allocation plan for the 
access seekers.  Since the train operators are independently managed, they will 
occasionally request overlapping train paths.  The infrastructure provider then has the 
responsibility to resolve their disputes in right-of-way.     
Efficient allocation is complicated by heterogeneous traffic condition (i.e. when 
trains are operating with a wide range of speeds).  Fig. 2 illustrates the effect on 
capacity utilisation when the traffic demand is homogeneous or otherwise.  Capacity 
utilisation is defined as the ratio of the time taken in operating a set of trains with their 
minimum headways (i.e. A  and B ) to the time taken in travelling at their actual 
timetables (i.e. W ) [4].  Clearly, when trains running at different speeds are scheduled 
together, more capacity is needed to generate the same number of services 
( WAWB // > ). 
In principle, the cost of additional capacity consumption may be recovered from 
the access charge.  However, the predefined tariffs in posted pricing are unlikely to 
respond to the ongoing changes in relative train speeds in the competitive market.  On 
the contrary, direct negotiation is able to provide a means to dynamically compute the 
associated costs of capacity utilisation and traction power supply.  Therefore, the 
access charge can be more appropriately recovered by negotiation if a high transaction 
speed is available.  In addition, negotiation allows the operational train speeds to be 
determined by the requirements of the access seekers.  If the service providers are 
willing to afford a higher tariff, heterogeneous traffic may be allowed, otherwise the 
infrastructure provider may offer a cheaper access charge for capacity saving. 
Maintenance costs of track and rolling-stock is another potential conflict to be 
resolved.  There is an indivisible relationship between rails and wheels.  Poor rail 
quality will induce an increased rolling-stock maintenance cost and vice versa.  In a 
‘closed’ railway market, the maintenance cost on rails can be balanced with the 
investments on rolling-stock’s quality.  However, with the separation of responsibilities, 
service providers may tend to keep maintenance on vehicles minimum so as to reduce 
their operating costs.  In order to recover the imposed maintenance fee, the 
infrastructure provider has to decide whether to raise the access price to reflect the 
actual damages on track or to restrict the use of track to better maintained rolling-stocks. 
Insert Figure 2 about here. 
3. METHODOLOGY 
3.1. Modelling and Computer Simulation 
There is a need to derive effective access pricing regimes to resolve disputes between 
railway stakeholders.  Various post-evaluations have been conducted with respect to 
regulatory efficiency [1], train planning process [5] and accounting performances of 
stakeholders
 
[6].  Findings derived from these studies can be applied in future 
improvements in the system, which is followed by a new cycle of post-evaluations.  
Unfortunately, the timely and costly execution often hinders the actual implementation 
of these new findings. 
With the advance of fast computing technologies, computer simulation is a 
cost-effective means to evaluate a hypothetical change in a system.  For example, 
simulation suites have been developed to study a variety of traffic control strategies 
according to sophisticated models of train dynamics, traction systems and power 
systems [7].  Simulation therefore allows pre-evaluation studies and avoids irreversible 
changes to the physical system.  Consequently, it is beneficial if the open market can 
be modelled in a similar manner to assist future improvements in railway operation.   
A simulation model is a representation of the behaviour of a system that can be 
executed in a computer.  Most simulation models are devised and implemented as a 
single (or central) computation unit which derives the expected system outputs by 
processing the user-specified inputs with an algorithm.  However, the idea of central 
evaluation is inappropriate for the railway open market due to the following 
characteristics. 
3.1.1. Distributed self-interested entities 
As a result of railway reforms, resource planning is now a distributed rather than a 
centralised problem and different stakeholders will inevitably attempt to optimise their 
internal benefits.  In fact, each of these optimisations are likely to involve multiple 
attributes such as cost and travelling times, and are subject to constraints derived from 
business (e.g. availability of rolling-stock supply), engineering (e.g. maximum line 
speeds) and regulations (e.g. regulated ceiling and floor prices).  Some of these 
constraints and their business objectives are not revealed to other stakeholders to avoid 
possible loss of advantage during the business transactions. 
A suitable modelling framework should therefore enable the representation of the 
stakeholders as separated entities with individual control over their information, 
decisions and actions.  The framework should also allow separate local simulation 
models for solving the distributed multi-dimensional constrained optimisation problems. 
3.1.2. Co-ordination via bargaining 
Despite the isolated control over their activities, the stakeholders are still 
inter-dependent during the formulation of train timetables.  In the case of negotiation, 
the stakeholders will attempt to persuade their negotiating partner to align with their 
operational objectives through bargaining.  To resemble the natural process of 
resolving conflicts, the modelling of the co-ordination activities is of utmost importance.  
As a result, apart from the distributed framework, there are additional requirements on 
modelling the interactions between the local entities, but classical simulation models are 
generally not designed to capture these behaviours. 
3.1.3. Rationality of local entities 
In principle, solving the local optimisation problem may take advantage of the classical 
simulation models.  The rational decisions may be the outputs of the local model while 
the operational objectives of the stakeholder can be considered as the user-specified 
inputs.  However, the choice of algorithm is complicated by the additional inputs from 
the responses of its interacting entities which can only be determined during runtime.  
These algorithms therefore require a certain degree of flexibility so that the distributed 
entities may decide the best actions dynamically without human interferences. 
Apart from being responsive to the changing environment, another dimension of 
rationality is proactiveness.  The local entities should be able to inspect their internal 
status and initiate activities (e.g. promotion of idle resources) which are consistent with 
their business goals in order to enhance the competitiveness of the stakeholders. 
 
3.2. Multi-Agent System 
Multi-agent system (MAS) modelling is a sub-field of Distributed Artificial Intelligence 
(DAI).  While classical AI focuses on mimicking the problem solving ability of 
individual organism in machines, DAI concentrates on more complex problems which 
are inherently distributed, where knowledge and activities are separated naturally in 
space [8].  Each entity in the group has problem-solving capabilities but the entire 
problem cannot be solved by a single entity.  By coordinated interaction, the entities 
resolve the complex problem in a timely and efficient manner [9].  In particular, MAS 
allows both co-operating and competing interactions.  Co-operative entities work 
towards a common goal while competing entities possess individual ones. 
The entities in MAS are called agents.  By definition, an agent is an encapsulated 
computer system, situates in some environment, and can act flexibly and autonomously 
in that environment to meet its design objectives [10].  Thus, an agent is a piece of 
software-driven hardware that can only work in some predetermined application 
domains (i.e. they are not ‘super-agents’), but provided that it is operating in these 
domains, it can handle its designated tasks rationally, and adapt to changes in a flexible 
manner without human interventions. 
There are increasing applications of MAS in engineering systems such as 
e-commerce [11, 12], data-mining [13, 14], and supply-chain management [15, 16].  In 
addition, there is a growing interest in applying MAS in transportation systems [17].  
In these applications, it is difficult to study and explain the complex system without 
modelling the intentions and activities of the local individuals (e.g. people, vehicles and 
companies) because the ultimate system behaviour emerges from the interactions among 
these entities.  The notion of a system composing of autonomous agents allows these 
complex systems to be studied from a ‘bottom-up’ approach. 
With the emergence of sophisticated agent development software such as JADE 
[18] and FIPA-OS [19], the development time of software agents can be considerably 
reduced.  These software toolkits mainly provide generic agent services regarding to 
communication, resource control, data access and encodings.  Nevertheless, developers 
are still required to devise the local agent structure and their communication scheme.  
These may be adopted from the agent modelling techniques (e.g. BDI model [20]), but 
it is also possible to apply analytical or AI models for agent reasoning. 
Another important concern when designing a MAS is the size of the agent 
community.  For example, a system could have only one layer of agents to represent 
the companies along a supply-chain, but it is equally feasible to expand two more layers 
for the departments within the companies and the staff working in the departments.  
The three-layered approach clearly requires a higher demand in modelling the autonomy 
and interactions of the agents, but more detailed studies can be performed at the 
department level and the personnel level.  Thus, the granularity of the agent society 
depends on the depth of study required.   
 
3.3. Modelling Railway Open Market with MAS 
Given its characteristics matches with the requirements in distributed self-interested 
entities, co-ordinated behaviours and local intelligence, MAS provides a suitable 
conceptual framework for the railway open market.  A realisation of MAS for railway 
resource management is illustrated in Fig. 3.   
This model contains one level of agents to represent the stakeholders in the railway 
market.  In addition to the infrastructure provider (IP) and train service providers 
(TSP), the model may also include ancillary companies, like rolling-stock providers 
(RSP) and maintenance service providers (MSP).  These stakeholders assign their 
confidential information such as cost curves and operational tactics to their 
corresponding software agents before they are connected to a common communication 
platform.  When an agent joins the platform, it is registered to the Directory Facilitator 
(DF) agent whose function is to maintain an updated record of the agent addresses and 
the services they provide.  A stakeholder agent may therefore recognise the existence 
of other agents by performing a query to the DF. 
An agent on the platform will either be perceived as a resource provider or a 
purchaser without deliberating its internal status to the other agents.  The agents on the 
platform are not expected to share a common goal, but they may form temporal 
association to examine whether a sale of resource is feasible and beneficial according to 
the pre-assigned criteria of the stakeholders.   
The framework may be used to conduct useful simulation studies in several levels.  
Firstly, the agent community can allow the study of the effects from different degrees of 
competition by altering the number of resource providers and/or purchasers.  This may 
aid the railway regulator to determine the correct degree of competition in railways.  
Secondly, different transaction policies (e.g. posted pricing, negotiation and auctioning) 
can be formulated and tested to improve the charging regime.  Further studies may also 
be performed to evaluate the impacts from any proposed changes in regulations, 
business objectives and engineering operations by modifying the rational behaviour of 
the agents.  For instance, constraints as a result of regulatory changes can be added 
locally to the relevant agents, and modification on business objectives and scheduling 
mechanism may be achieved by adjusting the internal cost functions and implementing 
a proper mathematical model respectively.  Results from these simulations may be 
used to improve capacity utilisation and competitiveness of the stakeholders.  
It is also valuable to note that agent modelling can also be applied in third-party 
access market.  In this case, one of the TSP agents will be possessed by the same 
stakeholder of the IP agent.  However, as most regulations will prevent unfair gain of 
track access by the incumbent owner of the infrastructure, the above and below railway 
activities will still be separately managed by different departments within the company.  
As a result, the two departments can still be modelled as separate agents. 
Insert Figure 3 about here. 
4. DEVELOPMENT OF MAS 
Conducting the entire study above requires extensive and detailed modelling of the 
individual agents and their interaction.  While it is beyond the scope of this paper to 
construct and analyse the MAS depicted in Fig. 3, a brief model for the direct 
negotiation between IP and TSP is given in this section to demonstrate the development 
of railway agents in the framework described.  
 
4.1. Communication Model 
The negotiation scheme between a TSP agent and an IP agent is adopted from a fuzzy 
constraint based model [21].  The possible agent actions and their relationship are 
illustrated in Fig. 4.  In this model, the bargaining process for a product is resolved as a 
prioritised fuzzy constraint satisfaction (PFCS) problem between a buyer and a seller.  
The buyer agent needs to obtain a product possessing several attributes (e.g. price, 
dimensions and colour), but their exact values will depend on the availability of the 
supply.  The agent therefore reserves a set of criteria on the attributes, which is 
modelled by a set of prioritised fuzzy constraints.  During the negotiation, the buyer 
agent has to specify its requirements on these attributes by submitting a selected set of 
crisp constraints (inequalities) to the seller agent via a FIND message.  The role of the 
seller agent is to generate a feasible offer according to the set of constraints and its own 
benefits.  When an offer is found, a CHECK reply is issued.  Otherwise, a RELAX 
message is sent and the buyer is prompted to modify one of the submitted constraints, 
which corresponds to making a concession.  However, even when an offer is generated, 
the buyer agent has the right to reject the product if the offer does not satisfy its 
requirements or if it cannot comply with the restrictions attached with the product.  In 
the former case, a FIND message enveloping a constraint on a new attribute will be 
forwarded to the seller agent, while in the latter case, a REFIND message will be issued 
and the seller will be asked to generate a new offer.  The negotiation is terminated by 
either an acceptance of a product (DEAL) or a failure in generating a feasible offer over 
the entire negotiation space (FAIL). 
This model is suitable for the IP-TSP transaction because it provides the TSP 
(buyer) with a means to deal with uncertainties due to the IP (seller).  For example, 
track access charge is often related to the market supply.  If track capacity is limited, 
the TSP may either raise the payment or select another schedule where capacity is 
available.  However, this information is unavailable until the negotiation has proceeded.  
By allowing a range of preference on the attributes, it creates the possibility of trade-off 
between certain attributes, which increases the chance of striking an agreement.  
Insert Figure 4 about here. 
4.2. Definition of Product (Track Access Right) 
A track access right consists of a feasible train schedule, an operable rolling-stock and a 
flex level used in timetable reallocation (a parameter denoting the flexibility that the IP 
can revise the TSP’s schedule when track capacity approaches to limitation).  In order 
to obtain the right of access, a TSP needs to pay a track access charge (TAC) to the IP.  
The product P  under negotiation can therefore be defined by Eq. (1): 
 
φω,,, Ψ= cP
 (1) 
where c  is the access charge [$]; RD TTS ,,, ζ=Ψ  is the train schedule consisting 
of the set of visiting stations }...,,1|{ si nisS == , the arrival time at the first station 
ζ  [hh:mm], the set of dwell times [min] }...,,1|{ siDD nitT ==  and a set of 
inter-station runtimes [min] }1...,,1|{ −== siRR nitT ; }...,,1|{ ri ni ==Ω∈ ωω  is 
the selected rolling-stock and }...,,1|{ fi ni ==Φ∈ φφ  is the selected flex. 
 
4.3. TSP Model 
The prioritised fuzzy constraint model [21] for the buyer agent is extended in a previous 
study [22] in order to model the specific objective for a railway TSP.  In that study, the 
satisfaction on the track access charge c  and train schedule Ψ  are represented by a 
set of fuzzy membership functions },{ and ...,,1 ),( Ψ∈= cXmiXiµ , from which the 
crisp constraints are derived.  A crisp constraint ba xxx ≤≤  on an attribute x  is 
denoted by the bounds ]|[ ba xx .  At the beginning of the negotiation, these 
constraints are set at the most preferred values }ˆ,ˆ{ Ψc .  A TSP agent’s decision to 
make a concession corresponds to reducing the lower limit ax  or increasing the upper 
limit bx  of a particular attribute.  Also, since the TSP may perceive some attributes to 
be more important over others, a priority value mii ...,,1],1,0[ =∈ρ  is associated 
with each attribute. 
Given an offer ',',','' φωΨ= cP  received from the IP agent, the acceptability of 
the product is modelled by Eq. (2):  
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However, even if the access charge and schedule times are acceptable, the TSP 
may not satisfy with the restrictions in rolling-stock type and flex attached with the offer.  
Consequently, the TSP agent also maintains two set of fuzzy values 
]1,0[},...,,1|{ ∈==
ii
fnifF r ωωω  and ]1,0[},...,,1|{ ∈== ii fnifF f φφφ  to 
indicate its degree of obedience to the rolling-stock and flex proposed.  The overall 
obedience level with respect to ',',','' φωΨ= cP  is defined by Eq. (3): 
 },min{)','(
'' φωφωβ ff=  (3) 
An offer is acceptable if it satisfies Eq. (4), where ]1,0[∈τ  is the accepting 
threshold specified by the user.  When 0=τ , there is a better opportunity for a 
successful negotiation because the TSP agent may concede over the entire range 
specified by the fuzzy membership functions.  On the other hand, when 1=τ , the TSP 
agent will only accept the most preferred schedule defined by the user. 
 { } τφωβα ≥)','(),'(min X    (4) 
 
4.4. IP Model 
The task performed by the IP agent is modelled as a combinatorial optimisation problem 
[23].  Given the discrete nature of the attributes in the definition of track access right 
and the objective of maximising the benefit of the infrastructure provider, a 
combinatorial optimisation problem is set up.  The objective function is to maximise 
the TAC received from the TSP and reduce the demand in capacity utilisation η∆  as 
shown in Eq. (5): 
 max ηη ∆−= wcU  (5) 
where ηw  is the unit valuation of capacity consumption [$]. 
The access charge is derived internally by the IP agent and is a composite charge 
consisting of track usage charge (TUC), traction energy charge (TEC), peak demand 
charge (PDC) and congestion charge (CGC) as defined by Eq. (6), (7), (8) and (9) 
respectively. 
 
−
=
=
1
1
1
sn
i
iv LncTUC
ωω
 (6) 
where ω1c  is the charge rate [$/veh-km] for rolling-stock ω ; ωvn  is the number of 
vehicles of the rolling-stock; iL  is the length of track [km] in inter-station run i . 
 ),(2 Ψ= ωEcTEC  (7) 
where 2c  is the charge rate [$/kWh] for electricity consumed; ),( ΨωE  is the unit of 
energy consumed [kWh] when rolling-stock ω  is running at schedule Ψ ;  
 ),(3 Ψ∆= ωPcPDC  (8) 
where 3c  is the charge rate [$/MW] for the increase in peak demand, ),( Ψ∆ ωP  is the 
increase in peak demand [MW] when rolling-stock ω  is running at schedule Ψ ;  
 
−
=
=
1
1
4 )exp(
sn
i
iiAdcCGC ηφ  (9) 
where 4c  is the charge rate [$/min] for the expected delay caused in the network, φd  
is the discount factor associated with flex φ ; iA  is a track specific constant. 
The optimisation problem defined in Eq. (5) is subject to the availability of 
capacity.  If the requested train schedule is occupied by other train services, the 
schedule is considered as infeasible.  Since the aim of the study is to demonstrate the 
capability of the modelling framework rather than to devise an efficiency search 
algorithm, exhaustive search has been used to determine the optimal solution.  
 
5. SIMULATION SETUP AND RESULTS 
The railway agents in this simulation are implemented in JADE [18] version 3.2.  
Three IP agents are constructed according to Table I.  It contains the settings on the 
capacity valuation weighting and the relevant charge rates.  Three types of 
rolling-stocks and flex levels are available for all negotiations, and the respective train 
lengths and discount factors are also included in the table.  The agents are assumed to 
have committed 3 train schedules (Fig. 5) prior to the negotiations.   
Table II further defines 7 TSP models, which display the most preferred train 
schedules and access charges, together with a set of assigned priorities over the 
attributes.  The fuzzy values on the 3 available types of rolling-stock and flex are set to 
indicate the agents’ obedience level to the respective restrictions.  In addition, all 
agents have identical acceptability threshold of 0.1 to avoid the possible failure in 
obtaining a track access right. 
These agents are then paired up according to Table III to simulate 8 bilateral 
IP-TSP transactions.  The train path of interest consists of 3 inter-station runs serving a 
set of 4 stations named A to D (Table IV).  The distance between the stations B and C 
is relatively long to simulate the railway transportation between 2 distanced cities. 
Insert Table I about here. 
Insert Figure 5 about here. 
Insert Tables II, III and IV about here. 
5.1. Study 1: Conflicts in Right-of-way 
In this study, the 2 TSP agents require the same set of preferred schedule times and 
access charge.  TSP-1 denotes a service provider with passenger-centric operational 
objective having high commitment to punctual station dwell times and inter-station 
runtimes, whereas TSP-2 aims at cost-reducing with high priority on the access charge 
and service start time (to reduce idle time cost of rolling-stock).  Both agents negotiate 
with the same infrastructure provider agent IP-1, but their preferred schedules are in 
conflict with the second train service shown in Fig. 5a.  The study therefore tests the 
ability for the agents to resolve conflicts in right-of-way. 
The results of the negotiation are depicted in Table V, and the resultant train 
schedules are illustrated in Fig. 6.  TSP-2 is able to acquire a schedule with no idle 
time (in operation at 07:50) and at a lower tariff, fulfilling its objective in cost reduction.  
On the other hand, given the unavailability of track capacity, TSP-1 is unable to obtain 
the preferred dwell times and runtimes, even though it is willing to pay a higher fee.  
Nevertheless, the train service of TSP-1 has avoided causing passenger dissatisfaction 
on short alighting times at the first 2 stations by extending the station dwell times.  The 
increased in journey time is neutralised by the delay in service start time (at 07:52).  
These differences in commencing time and dwell times have caused the overtaking of 
the conflicting train occurred at stations B and C for TSP-2 and TSP-1 respectively. 
The variations of the resulting schedules are related to the priority assignment.  
TSP-1, the passenger-centric agent, relaxes its constraints in the order of cost, start time, 
runtimes, and dwell times as specified by the assigned priorities.  On the other hand, 
TSP-2 relaxes its constraints in the reverse order.  When the TSP agents encounter a 
RELAX message, TSP-2 will first broaden the feasible range on dwell times, but TSP-1 
will maintain the preferred times and compromise with a higher access charge.  
Eventually, the differences in relaxation have led to broader acceptable ranges in dwell 
time at stations A and B for TSP-2 (4-7 minutes) and stricter for TSP-1 (5-6 minutes).  
By employing the shorter dwell times of 4 minutes, the train service of TSP-2 is able to 
overtake the conflicting service at station B.   
The schedule secured by TSP-2 also reduces the TAC mainly through the 
avoidance of the train operation close to 08:30 when the peak demand is highest.  This 
is reflected by the lower PDC of TSP-2 shown in Table V.  In addition, although the 
train service of TSP-2 consumes more capacity, the congestion charge (CGC) is cheaper 
when a higher flex level is accepted. 
The agents are therefore able to resolve conflicts according to their operating 
objectives.  It is also important to point out that during the negotiation, the TSP agents 
are aware of neither the right-of-way conflicts, nor the existence of the peak demand.  
Also, the TSP agents have no cooperative intention to compromise with the IP on such 
issues.  However, by offering different schedules at different prices, the TSP agents 
indirectly respond to the availability of the market supply.  The IP agent also derives 
suitable schedules according to the willingness-to-pay of the TSP agents.  
Insert Table V about here. 
Insert Figure 6 about here. 
5.2. Study 2: Conflicts in Capacity Incentives 
This study attempts to demonstrate the ability of the IP agent to respond to demands 
with different capacity incentives.  Three TSP agents are set up to negotiate with IP-2, 
but unlike the previous study, the required train times are not in conflicts with the 
scheduled services.  While the requested schedule of TSP-2 is set to be homogeneous 
to the existing traffic, TSP-3 and TSP-4 prefer shorter inter-station runtimes (i.e. 
heterogeneous demand).  In other words, there is a conflict in capacity incentives 
between the IP agent and the 2 TSP agents.  Moreover, priorities of TSP-3 and TSP-4 
are cost-reducing and passenger-centric respectively so that they differ in their 
operational objectives.  The capacity weighting of the IP agent is increased from 8000 
to 10,000 units to enhance the effect due to capacity consumption.   
Table VI shows the results of the 3 negotiations.  All 3 schedules are different 
with respect to the travelling times, but they share common restrictions on rolling-stock 
and flex.  The inter-station runtimes for TSP-2, TSP-3 and TSP-4 are {8, 70, 7}, {6, 68, 
6} and {6, 67, 6} respectively.  When compared to their most preferred runtimes of {8, 
70, 7}, {6, 65, 5} and {6, 65, 5}, only TSP-2 is able to obtained all of its most preferred 
values.  TSP-4 needs to extend its service runtimes slightly, but TSP-3 requires 
considerable increase in journey time.  In spite of the preferred shorter inter-station 
runtimes for TSP-3 and TSP-4, capacity utilisation in the 2 cases is slightly higher than 
that of TSP-2.  
Clearly, the minimum capacity consumption by TSP-2 is resulted from its 
inter-station runtimes being compatible with those of the existing services.  As 
mentioned, these trains may be scheduled to operate at the minimum headway so that 
more services may be scheduled on the track (Fig. 2a).  TSP-3 and TSP-4 do not lead 
to optimal allocation in term of capacity since their service runtimes deviate from the 
existing traffic.  This is consistent with the principles in scheduling heterogeneous 
traffic. 
Between the two agents requesting for heterogeneous train services, IP-2 also has 
the ability to propose different train schedules according to their willingness-to-pay.  
At the end of the two negotiations, the upper access price limit of TSP-4 is higher than 
that of TSP-3 by $50.  Being able to collect a higher TAC, TSP-4 is granted with a 
schedule that consumes more capacity and leads to more favourable train operating 
times from the TSP agent perspective.  
In other words, the IP agent can decide to allocate capacity ‘on-the-fly’.  As long 
as the TSP is willing to pay for its consumption on capacity usage, the request will be 
granted.  Otherwise, the TSP will be required to compromise with more homogenous 
traffic condition.  Rationality in capacity utilisation is therefore captured by the IP 
agent. 
Insert Table VI about here. 
5.3. Study 3: Conflicts in Maintenance Incentives 
Similar to study 2, this study involves 3 IP-TSP transactions.  However, instead of 
having different preferred schedule times and operation objectives, the TSP agents have 
different choices on rolling-stocks.  TSP-5 is willing to accept any of the 3 available 
rolling-stocks, whereas TSP-6 accepts either 2ω  or 3ω , and TSP-7 is the most 
restrictive as it accepts 3ω  only.  These rolling-stocks have increasing track usage 
charge rates of $0.04/veh-km, $0.08/veh-km and $0.12/veh-km.  
The track access charges of the 3 schedules obtained are negotiated as $1657, 
$1748 and $1845 respectively.  Inspecting Table VII reveals that the cause of the 
difference is contributed by the TUC.  Having the lowest TUC of $94, TSP-5 is able to 
obtain its target schedule at the lowest charge.  On the other hand, the TUCs for TSP-6 
and TSP-7 are two and three times higher than that of TSP-5.  Such increases in the 
TUCs are apparently resulted from the different charge rates.  The IP agent is therefore 
able to associate the rolling-stocks’ condition with the track usage rates.  The better 
conditions of 1ω  reduce the rail maintenance cost of the IP.  As a result, the IP is 
willing to offer TSP-5 the schedule at a lower tariff.  As TSP-6 and TSP-7 become 
more restrictive on their choices of rolling-stock, they are required to pay a higher 
charge accordingly. 
This study demonstrated the tug-of-war between a TSP and an IP on maintenance 
cost.  When a TSP agent is determined to use a rolling-stock of poorer quality, the IP 
agent avoids cross-subsidising the track maintenance cost by raising the TAC.  The 
higher track usage rate may therefore use to control the track maintenance required from 
the IP. 
Insert Table VII about here. 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
We have presented a MAS framework to model an open railway market.  Based on this 
framework, an agent negotiation between an IP and TSP has been modelled.  The 
simulation results have shown that these agents are able to settle the track access charge, 
schedule times and restrictions autonomously according to their assigned operational 
objectives.  By responding dynamically to the willingness-to-pay of the TSP agents, 
the IP agent is also capable of resolving conflicts in right-of-way and deriving solutions 
for differing incentives in capacity utilisation and maintenance cost.   
Agent modelling can therefore be a plausible means to capture the functional and 
behavioural requirements of the stakeholders.  However, it is not the intention of this 
work to suggest replacing the stakeholders with software agents in real-life transactions 
because the actual interactions between humans are certainly more complicated than the 
model given in this study.  Nevertheless, the continuation of development of the 
proposed framework is expected to provide a sensible tool to conduct critical analysis 
prior to the physical implementation of a regulatory or operational change. 
The presented work is a catalyst for further research works on enhancing the 
capabilities of the agents.  Agents modelled in this study are not incorporated with 
learning capabilities to adjust the satisfaction values and charge rates during the 
negotiation.  For example, the TSPs may not intend to adopt a fixed operational 
strategy (e.g. passenger-centric/cost-reducing) in their agents, but allows them to 
determine their behaviour according to the availability of track capacity supply.  By 
analysing the replies from the IP agent, the TSP agents may attempt to deduce whether 
the required track capacity has been occupied.  In this case, a passenger-centric TSP 
agent will have no reason to insist on its requirements and may opt for reducing the cost 
of expenditure.  On the other hand, the IP agent can learn from the TSP agent’s 
response and promote the idle resources proactively by lowering the relevant charge 
rates. 
In addition, there is a substantial need for devising a faster algorithm in generating 
a train schedule by the IP agent.  The time needed for simulations by the exhaustive 
search algorithm becomes impractical when the solution space is expanded by more 
stations, rolling-stock types and flex-levels.  This is especially important because 
negotiation is an iteratively process in which the algorithm will be frequently used.  
Since the optimisation problem is combinatorial, branch-and-bound algorithm and 
dynamic programming are the potentially deterministic methods for further evaluations. 
More complicated negotiations can also be modelled and studied.  For instance, 
track capacity may be better utilised if the IP agent can interleave between negotiations 
with different TSP agents.  With more information over the spectrum of demand, the IP 
agent can determine a better sequence to conduct the negotiations.  It is valuable to 
compare the performance in complexity and efficiency of this mechanism against 
auctioning of train paths where the IP agent is also handling multiple-transactions with 
different TSP agents simultaneously.  In addition, the MAS framework can also 
include RSP and MSP agents to enrich the simulations of the entire supply chain and 
study the effect of different level of competition in the market. 
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TABLE I  IP models 
Attribute IP-1 IP-2 IP-3 
ηw [$] 8000 10,000 10,000 
1
1
ω
c [$/veh-km] 0.04 0.04 0.04 
2
1
ω
c [$/veh-km] 0.06 0.06 0.08 
3
1
ω
c [$/veh-km] 0.16 0.16 0.12 
2c [$/kWh] 0.05 0.05 0.05 
3c [$/MW]  10.0 10.0 10.0 
4c [$/min] 250 250 250 
1ω
v
n  10 10 10 
2ω
v
n  8 8 10 
3ω
v
n  9 9 10 
1φd  1.00 1.00 1.00 
2φd  0.95 0.95 0.95 
3φd  0.90 0.90 0.90 
Traffic model TFF-1 TFF-2 TFF-2 
 
 
TABLE II  TSP models 
Attribute TSP-1 TSP-2 TSP-3 TSP-4 TSP-5 TSP-6 TSP-7 
ζˆ [hh:mm] 07:50 07:50 07:50 07:50 07:50 07:50 07:50 
DTˆ [min] {5, 5, 3, 3} {5, 5, 3, 3} {5, 5, 3, 3} {5, 5, 3, 3} {5, 5, 3, 3} {5, 5, 3, 3} {5, 5, 3, 3} 
RTˆ [min] {8, 70, 7} {8, 70, 7} {6, 65, 5} {6, 65, 5} {8, 70, 7} {8, 70, 7} {8, 70, 7} 
cˆ [$] 1600 1600 1600 1600 1600 1600 1600 
δρ  0.5 0.9 0.9 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 
DT
ρ  1.0 0.1 0.1 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
RT
ρ  0.9 0.5 0.5 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 
c
ρ  0.2 1.0 1.0 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 
1ω
f  1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.0 
2ω
f  0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.0 
3ω
f  0.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
1φf  1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
2φf  0.8 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 
3φf  0.0 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 
τ  0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
 
TABLE III  Simulation cases 
Study Cases IP-Model TSP-Model 
1 1  IP-1 TSP-1 
 2  IP-1 TSP-2 
2 3  IP-2 TSP-2 
 4 IP-2 TSP-3 
 5 IP-2 TSP-4 
3 6  IP-3 TSP-5 
 7 IP-3 TSP-6 
 8  IP-3 TSP-7 
 
 
TABLE IV  Track and station data 
Track Origin Destination Length [km] Track specific constant iA  
1 Station A Station B 20 1.2 
2 Station B Station C 200 1.0 
3 Station C Station D 15 1.1 
 
 
TABLE V  Simulation results for study 1 
Category Attribute Case 1 Case 2 
Track access right ζ [hh:mm] 07:52 07:50 
 DT [min] {6, 6, 3, 3} {4, 4, 3, 3} 
 RT [min] {9, 72, 8} {8, 72, 8} 
 c [$] 1783 1698 
 ω  2ω  2ω  
 φ  2φ  3φ  
Constraint set  ζ [hh:mm] [07:50|07:52] [07:50|07:51] 
in final round DT [min] [5|6, 5|6, 3|3, 3|3] [4|7, 4|7, 3|4, 3|4] 
 RT [min] [8|9, 69|72, 7|8] [8|9, 69|72, 7|8] 
 c [$] [0|1800] [0|1700] 
IP Utility U [$] 1651 1524 
 TUC [$] 113 113 
 TEC [$] 567 567 
 PDC [$] 130 90 
 CGC [$] 974 926 
 η∆  0.0166 0.0215 
 
 
TABLE VI  Simulation results for study 2 
Category Attribute Case 3 Case 4 Case 5 
Track access right ζ [hh:mm] 07:50 07:50 07:50 
 DT [min] {5, 5, 3, 3} {5, 7, 3, 3} {5, 5, 3, 3} 
 RT [min] {8, 70, 7} {6, 68, 6} {6, 67, 6} 
 c [$] 1634 1649 1664 
 ω  2ω  2ω  2ω  
 φ  3φ  3φ  3φ  
Constraint set  ζ [hh:mm] [07:50|07:51] [07:50|07:51]  [07:50|07:51] 
in final round DT [min] [5|6, 5|6, 3|4, 3|4] [5|7, 5|7, 3|4, 3|4] [5|5, 5|5, 3|3, 3|3] 
 RT [min] [8|8, 70|71, 7|7] [6|7, 65|68, 5|6] [6|7, 65|67, 5|6] 
 c [$] [0|1650] [0|1650] [0|1700] 
IP Utility U [$] 1541 1478 1487 
 TUC [$] 113 113 113 
 TEC [$] 576 580 588 
 PDC [$] 80 80 90 
 CGC [$] 865 872 873 
 η∆  0.0093 0.0170 0.0186 
 
 
TABLE VII  Simulation results for study 3 
Category Attribute Case 6 Case 7 Case 8 
Track access right ζ [hh:mm] 07:50 07:50 07:50 
 DT [min] {5, 5, 3, 3} {5, 5, 3, 3} {5, 5, 3, 3} 
 RT [min] {8, 70, 7} {8, 71, 7} {8, 70, 7} 
 c [$] 1657 1748 1845 
 ω  1ω  2ω  3ω  
 φ  3φ  3φ  3φ  
Constraint set  ζ [hh:mm] [07:50|07:50] [07:50|07:51]  [07:50|07:51] 
in final round DT [min] [5|5, 5|5, 3|3, 3|3] [5|5, 5|5, 3|3, 3|3] [5|5, 5|5, 3|3, 3|3] 
 RT [min] [8|8, 70|70, 7|7] [8|8, 70|71, 7|7] [8|8, 70|71, 7|7] 
 c [$] [0|1700] [0|1750] [0|1850] 
IP Utility U [$] 1564 1639 1752 
 TUC [$] 94 188 282 
 TEC [$] 608 603 608 
 PDC [$] 90 90 90 
 CGC [$] 865 866 865 
 η∆  0.0093 0.0108 0.0093 
 
 
